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During maintenance troubleshooting for fluctuating hydraulic pressures, a technician found that a 
right hand aileron return line, on the flight hydraulic side, was ruptured (Fig. 1, 2).  This tubing is 
part of the Hydraulic Flight Control Aileron Return Reducer to Aileron Manifold and is suspected to 
be original to the T-38 Talon trainer aircraft.  Ailerons are small hinged sections on the outboard 
portion of a wing used to generate rolling motion thereby banking the aircraft.  The ailerons work by 
changing the effective shape of the airfoil of the outer portion of the wing [1].  The drawing, 
Northrop P/N 3-43033-55 (6/1960), specifies that the line is made from 0.375 inch OD, aluminum 
5052-0 tubing with a 0.049 inch wall thickness.  WW-T-787 requires the tube shall be seamless and 
uniform in quality and temper [2].  The test pressure for this line is 3000 psi, and the operational 
pressure for this line is estimated to be between 45 psi and 1500 psi based on dynamic loading 
during flight. 
 
Examination of the fracture surface found evidence of arrest bands originating on the inner diameter 
(Fig 3).  Ductile dimples are observed on the tube fractures (Fig. 4).  The etched cross-section 
revealed thinning and work-hardening in the burst region (Fig. 5).  The wall thickness just outside 
the work-hardened fracture region measured 0.035”. 
 
Barlow’s Formula:  P = 2St/D, where P is burst pressure, S is allowable stress, t is wall thickness 
and D is the outer diameter of tube.  Using the ultimate tensile strength of 28 ksi and a measured 
wall thickness of 0.035 inches at burst, P = 5.2 ksi (burst pressure).  Using the yield of 13 ksi (YS) 
for aluminum 5052-0, plastic deformation will happen at P = 2.4 ksi suggesting plastic deformation 
occurred at a proof pressure of 3.0 ksi. 
 
Conclusion: 
The burst resulted from high stress, low-cycle fatigue.   
 Evidence of arrest bands originating on the inner diameter. 
 Fracture is predominately shear dimples, characteristic of high load ductile fractures (Fig 6). 
 Section wall reduction in the burst region. 
 Plastic deformation and thinning of the out-of-specification tube wall likely happened during 
the initial proof testing years ago. 
 Metallography of tubing away from rupture site confirmed tubing was seamless. 
Based on the tube microstructure, it is likely that the initial wall thickness was about 30 % thinner 
than the requirement of 0.049 inches.  Fracture initiated on the ID and progressed to the OD (shear 
lip).  The tube is made of the correct material of 5052-0 aluminum as verified using Optical 
Emission Spectroscopy (Table 2).  The tubing hardness tested 77 HV100 (77 HRE).  This hardness 
is slightly above the requirement for 70 HRE maximum for aluminum 5052-0 in AMS 2658C [3]. 
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Fig 1. The as-received tube from the T-38 (N907) hydraulic flight control aileron return reducer 
to aileron manifold exhibits a burst at the arrow location. 
Fig 2. A close-up of the burst region on the hydraulic tube is shown. 
  
Fig 3.  SEM micrograph of fracture surface exhibiting crack arrest bands (arrows) originating on 
the tube ID.  The multiple site arrest bands are semi-circular in shape with the radii originating in 
the center of the tube.  A shear lip (stars) is noted on the tube OD. 
Fig 4.  SEM micrograph of fracture surface exhibiting mostly U-shaped shear dimples. 
  
Fig 5.  Cross section of fracture as-etched (Barkers) showing wall reduction and elongated grains. Fig 6.  SEM micrograph of fracture at ID demonstrating low cycle fatigue striations. 
 
Wall Thickness Req. Near Failure Failed Tube Away from Failure Replacement Tubing 
0.049 Inch 0.039  Inch 0.045 Inch 0.053 Inch 
Table 1.  Dimensional Analysis of Wall Thickness 
WW-T-787b Chemical Composition Requirements Optical Emission Spectroscopy Test Results 
Element Percent Percent 
Magnesium 2.2 – 2.8 % 2.24% 
Chromium 0.15 – 0.35 % 0.21% 
Iron plus Silicon 0.0 - 0.45 % 0.29% 
Manganese 0.0 - 0.10 % 0.01% 
Copper 0.0 - 0.10 % 0.03% 
Zinc 0.0 - 0.10 % 0.01% 
Aluminum Remainder 96.39% 
Table 2.  Optical Emission Spectroscopy (OES) 
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T-38A Aircraft General Characteristics: 
General Characteristics1  
Primary Function: Advanced jet pilot trainer for Astronauts and as chase plane for 
Manned Space Flight Programs. 
Builder: Northrop Corp.  
Power Plant: Two General Electric J85-GE-5 turbojet engines with afterburners  
Thrust: 2,050 pounds dry thrust; 2,900 with afterburners  
Thrust (with PMP): 2,200 pounds dry thrust; 3,300 with afterburners  
Length: 46 feet, 4 inches (14 meters)  
Height: 12 feet, 10 inches (3.8 meters)  
Wingspan: 25 feet, 3 inches (7.6 meters)  
Speed: 812 mph (Mach 1.08 at sea level)  
Ceiling: Above 55,000 feet (16,764 meters)  
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 12,093 pounds (5,485 kilograms)  
Range: 1,093 miles  
Unit Cost: $756,000 (1961 constant dollars)  
Crew: Two, student and instructor  
Incident Aircraft:  Tail # N907 
1Air Force Fact Sheet, T-38 Falcon 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=126 
Starboard 
Aileron 
Background: 
During a Functional Check Flight (FCF), the pilot observed fluttered movement on the  
flight system hydraulic pressure indicator. 
Hydraulic power is supplied by two 
systems2:  
 The utility system & the flight control 
system. 
Each system is powered by a piston-type 
engine-driven pump.  The left engine 
drives the utility system pump and the 
right engine drives the flight control 
system pump. 
They two systems are identical in 
operation and provide redundancy in 
the event either system should fail. 
Both systems operate at 3,000 PSI.  All 
hydraulic pressure lines are corrosion 
resistant steel.  Return and suction 
rigid lines are aluminum alloy, except 
in landing gear wheel wells and aft of 
engine firewall. 
2Air Force T.O. 1T-38A-2-4, Chapter 8 Hydraulic Power System 
Utility System 
Hydraulic Pressure 
Indicator 
Flight System 
Hydraulic Pressure 
Indicators 
Aileron Actuating Cylinder: 
Underside view of starboard wing showing 
hydraulic aileron actuator system. 
The blue arrow points to blue dot indicating 
lever passed inspection.  This lever was 
responsible for the accident resulting in 
fatal injuries to Air Force Major Blair 
Faulkner and 2nd Lt. Matthew Emmons 
during take-off from Columbus AFB Miss 
on 23 April 2008.  Mechanical damage 
caused by fatigue resulted in an 
uncommanded roll to the left3. 
NASA Astronaut Clifton Curtis Williams was 
killed  05 October 1967 near Tallahassee, 
FL when his plane went into an 
uncontrollable aileron roll. 
Fittings from failed tubing can be seen 
(red arrows).  The majority of tubing 
lies fore within a different panel not 
visible in view.  Dotted lines represent 
failed tubing position. 
3http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123109949 
Burst Hydraulic Aileron Return Line: 
Fractography: 
Fracture surface has some crack arrest bands  (red 
arrows) originating on the tube ID.  Multiple 
site arrest bands are semi-circular in shape with 
radii originating in the center of tube.  Shear lip 
(red stars) is noted near the tube OD. 
Ratchet marks are observed on the ID (black 
arrows), indicating high local stress and multiple 
stack initiation sites on different planes. 
Tube OD 
Paint 
Tube ID 
Ductile dimple mode fracture adjacent to cleavage 
facets indicate a high level of stress (above the 
yield strength) at the origin surface. 
Tear ridges originate on the tube ID and progress 
towards the OD. 
Fractography: 
Tube OD 
Tube ID 
Dimensional Analysis of Wall Thickness: 
Wall Thickness 
Requirement5	  
Wall Thickness of Failed 
Tube Near Failure	  
Wall Thickness of Failed Tube 
Away from Failure	   Replacement Tubing	  
0.049”	   0.0347”	   0.0454”	   0.053”	  
5Northrup P/N 3-43033-55 (6/1960) 
Failed Tube Away From Failure Failed Tube Near Point of Failure 
Metallography of Fracture Origin: 
Elongated grains microstructure  
near the fracture surface is 
evident in the as-etched 
condition (Barker’s reagent). 
Tube ID 
Cold Work 
(deformation lines) 
Fracture 
Surface 
Direction of 
Crack Growth 
Stress Analysis: 
Assuming a straight tube section remote from any geometrical stress concentration features the stresses 
associated from only internal pressure loading for a thin wall tube are given by the following relationship.  
The thin wall formulation assumes a uniformly distributed stress over the wall thickness and is valid only 
for geometric sections such that R/t > 10. 
If the tube geometry is such that R/t<10 then the thick wall cylinder solution is required to accurately 
characterize the stress distribution over the wall thickness.  The stress relationship for a thick wall 
cylindrical vessel configuration is provided below (σ2 defines the hoop stress in the formulation below). 
For a 3/8” tube with a wall thickness of 0.049” the ratio of the inside radius to wall 
thickness is 2.8 which is less than required 10 or more ratio. 
The thin and thick wall peak stress result for a unit internal pressure of 1,000 psi is 2.826 and 3.401 ksi 
respectively.  A plot of the thin and thick wall stress distribution for the unit pressure load of 1,000 psi is 
provided below. 
Stress Analysis: 
Stress Analysis: 
The pressure failure load for a 3/8” OD tube with a wall thickness of 0.049” is projected analytically.  An 
elastic perfectly-plastic material response is assumed using the average of the yield (13 ksi) and ultimate (28 
ksi) material allowables; (flow/yield stress = 20.5 ksi).  A net section collapse is utilized as the failure 
criterion (no stress concentrations and thus no steep gradients present which typically justify incorporating a 
strain-to-failure exceedance).  At 6,500 psi the flow stress almost fully consumes the tube section and 
analytical convergence at 7,000 psi was not possible. 
Therefore it is concluded that the analytical failure pressure is between 7,000 and 6,500 psi. 
6,000 psi internal pressure nonlinear stress distribution 
OD=3/8”  Th=0.049” 
6,500 psi internal pressure nonlinear stress distribution 
OD=3/8”  Th=0.049” 
4,000 psi internal pressure nonlinear stress distribution 
OD=3/8”  Th=0.035” 
Stress Analysis: 
The pressure failure load for a 3/8” OD tube with a wall thickness of 0.035” is projected analytically.  An 
elastic perfectly-plastic material response is assumed using the average of the yield (13 ksi) and ultimate (28 
ksi) material allowables; (flow/yield stress = 20.5 ksi).  A net section collapse is utilized as the failure 
criterion (no stress concentrations and thus no steep gradients present which typically justify incorporating a 
strain-to-failure exceedance).  At 4,250 psi the flow stress almost fully consumes the tube section and 
analytical convergence at 4,500 psi was not possible.   
Therefore it is concluded that the analytical failure pressure is between 4,250 and 4,500 psi. 
4,250 psi internal pressure nonlinear stress distribution 
OD=3/8”  Th=0.035” 
Optical Emission Spectroscopy (OES): 
Chemical Composition Requirement6	   OES Test Results	  
Element	   Percent	   Percent	  
Magnesium	   2.2 – 2.8 %	   2.24%	  
Chromium	   0.15 – 0.35 %	   0.21%	  
Iron plus Silicon	   0.0 - 0.45 %	   0.29%	  
Manganese	   0.0 - 0.10 %	   0.01%	  
Copper	   0.0 - 0.10 %	   0.03%	  
Zinc	   0.0 - 0.10 %	   0.01%	  
Aluminum	   Remainder	   96.39%	  
6Air Force WW-T-787B Canc: Tube, Aluminum Alloy, Round, Square, Rectangular, 
and Other Shapes, Drawn, Seamless, 5052 
Summary of Observations: 
•  Crack arrest bands were observed at low magnification 
originating on the ID. 
•  Ductile dimple mode fracture is observed on the tube fractures. 
•  Cleavage facets and ductile dimple mode fracture are observed 
in the fracture initiating at the tube ID. 
•  The unetched cross-section reveals thinning in the burst region. 
•  The etched microstructure reveals work-hardening in the 
necking region. 
•  The nominal thickness of the tube (away from the burst) 
measured 30% below specification. 
•  OES confirms the hydraulic tube is made of the correct 
material (5052 Aluminum). 
•  Conductivity confirms the hydraulic tube is in the annealed 
condition, 36% International Annealed Copper Standard 
(IACS). 
•  The hardness tested slightly above (77 HRE) the maximum 
hardness (70 HRE) for 5052-O. 
Summary of Observations: 
Conclusions: 
•  The hydraulic tube failed from high stress, low-cycle fatigue 
(LCF) initiated on the tube ID and progressed to the OD (shear 
lip). 
•  Crack arrest bands indicate the failure took several cycles to 
fail. 
•  The fracture exhibits predominant shear dimples which are 
characteristic of high load ductile fractures. 
•  Distortion and wall thickness reduction during failure also 
indicate very high loads. 
Conclusions: 
•  Based on the tube microstructure through the burst, it is likely 
that the initial wall thickness was about 0.035” rather than the 
requirement of 0.049”.  
•  The wall thickness was approximately 30% thinner than 
required.  Plastic deformation and thinning of the out-of-
specification tube wall likely occurred during the initial proof 
testing many years ago. 
